

## Message Text

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INFO OCT-01 AF-05 ISO-00 EUR-06 CIAE-00 NSAE-00 RSC-01

/023 R

DRAFTED BY INR/RAA:LHEYNIGER  
APPROVED BY INR/RAA:CTTHORNE  
AF/E:RSMITH (IN DRAFT)  
AF/S:RDOLS (IN DRAFT)

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R 262053Z JUN 74

FM SECSTATE WASHDC  
TO AMEMBASSY LUSAKA

S E C R E T STATE 137664

NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM

E.O. 11652 XGDS

TAGS: PINR ZA SF MZ

SUBJECT: SAG VIEWS OF DEVELOPMENTS IN MOZAMBIQUE

REF: A. STATE 135850 B. LUSAKA 1321

1. INR NOTE RAAN-25 OF MAY 30, SUBJECT; "SOUTH AFRICA'S  
OPTIONS FOR ANGOLA AND MOZAMBIQUE" REPEATED HEREWITH FOR  
YOUR INFORMATION.

THE MILITARY COUP IN PORTUGAL MAY HAVE ITS MOST SEVERE  
SHORT-TERM IMPACT IN AFRICA. SOUTH AFRICA AND RHODESIA  
ARE DEEPLY CONCERNED ABOUT PROSPECTIVE CHANGES IN LISBON'S  
OVERSEAS POLICY AND MAY TRY TO PROTECT THEIR INTERESTS BY  
HELPING TO INSTALL GOVERNMENTS THAT THEY CAN CONTROL IN  
ANGOLA AND MOZAMBIQUE. SOUTH AFRICA, APPREHENSIVE ABOUT  
ITS OWN SECURITY, MAY TRY EVEN HARDER THAN BEFORE FOR US  
SUPPORT. CONVERSELY, MORE ISOLATED THAN EVER, SOUTH  
AFRICA MAY BECOME MORE SUSCEPTIBLE TO US PRESSURES TO  
AVOID ADVENTURIST POLICIES IN THE PORTUGUESE TERRITORIES.

PRETORIA'S TIES WITH PORTUGUESE AFRICA

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SOUTH AFRICA ADAPTED QUICKLY TO THE NEW SITUATIONS CREATED IN ANGOLA AND MOZAMBIQUE BY THE APRIL 25 COUP IN PORTUGAL. BY APRIL 28 THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT ANNOUNCED ITS RECOGNITION OF THE NEW REGIME IN LISBON.

IN THE PAST, SOUTH AFRICA AND RHODESIA HAVE HAD NOT ONLY TRADITIONAL CONSULAR AND COMMERCIAL CONTACTS WITH THE PORTUGUESE IN AFRICA BUT ALSO WELL-DEVELOPED DEFENSE AND SECURITY TIES.

THERE ARE SOUTH AFRICAN MILITARY LIAISON OFFICERS IN BOTH ANGOLA AND MOZAMBIQUE.

SOUTH AFRICAN AND RHODESIAN MILITARY AIRCRAFT HAVE FREQUENTLY OPERATED IN MOZAMBIQUE.

TWO SAAF PHOTO-RECONNAISSANCE PLANES RECENTLY SCOUTED THE CONGO-CABINDA BORDER FOR THE PORTUGUESE.

THE SOUTH AFRICAN BUREAU FOR STATE SECURITY, THE RHODESIAN CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATION, AND THE PORTUGUESE DIRECTORATE OF GENERAL SECURITY (DGS) HAVE REGULARLY EXCHANGED INFORMATION ABOUT INSURGENT GROUPS, AND SOUTH AFRICA HAS FUNDED SPECIAL COUNTERINSURGENT OPERATIONS. THE DGS IS NOW BEING DISMANTLED IN PORTUGAL; IT CONTINUES TO EXIST IN THE TERRITORIES, ALTHOUGH NOW SUBORDINATED TO THE MILITARY. AS LONG AS THIS COOPERATION CONTINUES, PRETORIA AND SALISBURY WILL BE AT LEAST SOMEWHAT REASSURED

#### WEIGHING THE ALTERNATIVES

THE SOUTH AFRICAN AND RHODESIAN GOVERNMENTS AT FIRST MAY HAVE HOPED THAT THE MILITARY COUP IN PORTUGAL HELD NO SERIOUS PROBLEMS FOR THE NEAR TERM. NOW, WITH THE REALIZATION THAT THE NEW LISBON REGIME IS NOT SIMPLY THE CONVENTIONAL STEREOTYPE OF A MILITARY DICTATORSHIP BUT INCLUDES A SOCIALIST FOREIGN MINISTER WHO IS ACTIVELY NEGOTIATING WITH THE AFRICAN INSURGENTS, PRETORIA AND SALISBURY PRESUMABLY ARE ASSESSING A NUMBER OF POSSIBLE COURSES OF ACTION:

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#### STIFFENING LISBON

SOUTH AFRICA AND RHODESIA ALMOST CERTAINLY WILL HOPE TO PERSUADE THE NEW PORTUGUESE GOVERNMENT TO KEEP EFFECTIVE CONTROL OF ANGOLA AND MOZAMBIQUE,-WHATEVER INTERNAL ADJUSTMENTS MUST BE MADE TO GIVE EFFECT TO 'SELF-DETERMINATION.'" SOUTH AFRICA COULD OFFER LARGE FINANCIAL

INDUCEMENTS. HOW LISBON WOULD RESPOND COULD DEPEND ON MANY FACTORS, SUCH AS HOW PROMISING INITIAL TALKS WITH THE GUERRILLAS TURN OUT TO BE, AND WHETHER THE COLONIAL ISSUE CAN BE KEPT WITHIN MANAGEABLE LIMITS IN PORTUGUESE DOMESTIC POLITICS.

#### MILITARY SEIZURE

EVENTS IN MOZAMBIQUE ARE MORE IMPORTANT TO PRETORIA THAN EVENTS IN ANGOLA. NAMIBIA AND BOTSWANA ARE BUFFERS TO THE WEST AND NORTH, BUT SOUTH AFRICA HAS A LONG AND OPEN BORDER WITH MOZAMBIQUE. IN ADDITION, IMPORTANT RAIL LINKS BETWEEN RHODESIA AND SOUTH AFRICA TO PORTS IN MOZAMBIQUE HANDLE A SUBSTANTIAL PERCENTAGE OF THE "WHITE REDOUBTS" EXTERNAL TRADE.

PRETORIA PROBABLY WOULD CONSIDER A MILITARY TAKEOVER IN MOZAMBIQUE, PARTICULARLY SOUTH OF THE SAVE RIVER (AT ABOUT THE 21ST PARALLEL), IF THE PORTUGUESE ARMED FORCES WITHDRAW FROM THE TERRITORY. SEIZING THE AREA NORTH TO THE ZAMBEZI (ROUGHLY THE 16TH PARALLEL) WOULD ALSO KEEP THE RAIL LINK FROM BEIRA TO SALISBURY, AS WELL AS THE NEARLY COMPLETED CABORA BASSA DAM AND POWER STATION, IN WHITE HANDS, BUT MIGHT STRETCH SOUTH AFRICA'S FORCES BEYOND THEIR PRESENT LIMITED CAPABILITIES.

WHATEVER AREA WAS INVOLVED, SUCH DIRECT ACTION WOULD ALSO BRING SERIOUS INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL REACTIONS. PRETORIA WILL PROBABLY DECIDE TO INVADE SOUTHERN MOZAMBIQUE ONLY AS A LAST AND DESPERATE RESORT.

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RHODESIA'S UNILATERAL DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE IN 1965 HAS BROUGHT PROBLEMS FOR PRETORIA AS WELL AS SALISBURY. WHILE REFUSING TO ACCORD DIPLOMATIC RECOGNITION TO RHODESIA, THE SOUTH AFRICANS HAVE NEVERTHELESS ASSISTED THE SMITH REGIME IN SEVERAL IMPORTANT WAYS, INCLUDING THE EVASION OF SANCTIONS. THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT MIGHT THEREFORE ALSO ENCOURAGE AND AID SETTLER SECESSIONIST MOVEMENTS IN THE PORTUGUESE TERRITORIES. PRETORIA PROBABLY BELIEVES THAT CHANCES OF SUCCESS ARE CONSIDERABLY STRONGER IN ANGOLA THAN IN MOZAMBIQUE. THE 300,000 WHITE SETTLERS IN ANGOLA PRESENTLY FACE A MUCH LESS SERIOUS INSURGENT THREAT THAN THAT CONFRONTING THE 264,000 EUROPEANS IN MOZAMBIQUE.# BUT IN EITHER TERRITORY, SECESSION WOULD SOONER OR LATER RESULT IN WORSENING RACE RELATIONS AND RACIAL VIOLENCE THAT WOULD FORECAST A BLEAK FUTURE FOR A

WHITE SETTLER REGIME.

#ESTIMATES OF THE NUMBER OF SETTLERS VARY GREATLY; THE FIGURES ABOVE HAVE BEEN TAKEN FROM THE JANUARY 1974 NIS BASIC INTELLIGENCE FACTBOOK.

MODERATE AFRICAN GOVERNMENTS

IN RECENT YEARS SOUTH AFRICA HAS TRIED TO PROVE TO ITSELF AND OTHERS THAT IT CAN GET ALONG WITH INDEPENDENT AFRICAN STATES ON OR NEAR ITS BORDERS. THE FORMER BRITISH HIGH COMMISSION TERRITORIES (BOTSWANA, LESOTHO, AND SWAZILAND), AS WELL AS MALAWI FARTHER NORTH, ARE ALL SEEN FROM PRETORIA AS SIMILAR TO THE INDEPENDENT AFRICAN "HOMELANDS" ENVISAGED IN ITS OWN NATIONAL PROGRAM OF "SEPARATE DEVELOPMENT."

IF ANGOLA AND MOZAMBIQUE WERE TO BECOME INDEPENDENT, HOWEVER, THEY WOULD PRESENT NEW AND CRUCIAL DIFFERENCES. UNLIKE THE OTHER STATES, THEY HAVE ACCESS TO THE SEA AND LARGE PORTS, AND THEIR ECONOMIES WOULD NOT NECESSARILY BE UNDER DE FACTO SOUTH AFRICAN CONTROL. PRETORIA WOULD PROBABLY BE UNCOMFORTABLE WITH AN INDEPENDENT GOVERNMENT IN LUANDA, OR ESPECIALLY LOURENCO MARQUES, WHICH DID NOT SHARE ITS DEFINITION OF "MODERATE."

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THE KATANGA PARALLEL

GIVEN THEIR CONCERN FOR SECURITY, AND THEIR LIMITED MILITARY CAPACITIES, PRETORIA AND SALISBURY MAY TRY, ALONG WITH PORTUGUESE BUSINESS AND SETTLER INTERESTS IN ANGOLA AND MOZAMBIQUE, TO CREATE NEW "KATANGAS" IN THE PORTUGUESE TERRITORIES. CAREFULLY SELECTED BLACK PERSONALITIES WOULD BE INSTALLED IN OFFICE TO PRESENT THE FACADE OF INDEPENDENT STATUS, WITH SOUTH AFRICANS AND PORTUGUESE DISPENSING FUNDS AND ADVICE BEHIND THE SCENES. THESE PUPPET STATES WOULD BE PROTECTED FROM CONTINUING INSURGENT ATTACKS BY HIGHLY PAID BLACK TROOPS BOLSTERED BY MERCENARIES FROM SOUTH AFRICA, RHODESIA, AND ELSEWHERE. FROM SOUTH AFRICA'S VIEWPOINT, THE RESULT MIGHT ADMITTEDLY BE FAR FROM PERFECT BUT PERHAPS WORTH AN EFFORT. UNACCEPTABLE TO MOST AFRICAN GOVERNMENTS AND TO MOST OF THE WORLD AT LARGE, THESE REGIMES MIGHT HAVE CONSIDERABLE SHORT-TERM SUCCESS, BUT THEIR LONGER RANGE CHANCES WOULD BE QUESTIONABLE.

SEEKING TO ENGAGE THE US

ANXIOUS OVER THE POSSIBLE CONSEQUENCES OF THE LISBON COUP FOR THEIR NATIONAL AND REGIONAL INTERESTS, THE SOUTH AFRICANS PROBABLY WILL TRY EVEN HARDER THAN THEY ALREADY HAVE TO ATTRACT US INTEREST AND SUPPORT. IN ADDITION TO PLAYING ON OLD THEMES ABOUT SOUTH AFRICA'S STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE, THEY WILL USE DEVELOPMENTS IN THE PORTUGUESE TERRITORIES TO TRY TO PROVOKE US ALARM ABOUT SOUTHERN

AFRICA AND BRING ABOUT A CLOSER RELATIONSHIP AND "UNDERSTANDING" WITH THE UNITED STATES. BUT IN THE WAKE OF THE DEVELOPMENTS IN PORTUGAL, SOUTH AFRICA IS LIKELY TO BECOME MORE ISOLATED THAN EVER. ATTEMPTS TO IMPROVE RELATIONS WITH THE US WOULD REFLECT PRETORIA'S DEFENSIVENESS AND ANXIETY. DESPITE ITS PROBABLE DEEP CONCERN ABOUT ANGOLA AND MOZAMBIQUE, SOUTH AFRICA MAY THEREFORE NOW BE SUSCEPTIBLE TO US PRESSURE NOT TO ENGAGE IN ADVENTURIST POLICIES IN THE PORTUGUESE TERRITORIES. SISCO

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## Message Attributes

**Automatic Decaptioning:** X  
**Capture Date:** 01 JAN 1994  
**Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Current Classification:** UNCLASSIFIED  
**Concepts:** GOVERNMENT OVERTHROW, POLITICAL SITUATION, SELFDETERMINATION  
**Control Number:** n/a  
**Copy:** SINGLE  
**Draft Date:** 26 JUN 1974  
**Decaption Date:** 01 JAN 1960  
**Decaption Note:**  
**Disposition Action:** RELEASED  
**Disposition Approved on Date:**  
**Disposition Authority:** BoyleJA  
**Disposition Case Number:** n/a  
**Disposition Comment:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
**Disposition Date:** 28 MAY 2004  
**Disposition Event:**  
**Disposition History:** n/a  
**Disposition Reason:**  
**Disposition Remarks:**  
**Document Number:** 1974STATE137664  
**Document Source:** CORE  
**Document Unique ID:** 00  
**Drafter:** LHEYNIGER  
**Enclosure:** n/a  
**Executive Order:** X2  
**Errors:** N/A  
**Film Number:** D740169-0674  
**From:** STATE  
**Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
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**Legacy Key:** link1974/newtext/t19740611/aaaaaiyb.tel  
**Line Count:** 239  
**Locator:** TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM  
**Office:** ORIGIN INR  
**Original Classification:** SECRET  
**Original Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Original Previous Classification:** n/a  
**Original Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Page Count:** 5  
**Previous Channel Indicators:**  
**Previous Classification:** SECRET  
**Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Reference:** A. STATE 135850 B. LUSAKA 1321  
**Review Action:** RELEASED, APPROVED  
**Review Authority:** BoyleJA  
**Review Comment:** n/a  
**Review Content Flags:**  
**Review Date:** 03 JUN 2002  
**Review Event:**  
**Review Exemptions:** n/a  
**Review History:** RELEASED <03 JUN 2002 by kelleyw0>; APPROVED <25 MAR 2003 by BoyleJA>  
**Review Markings:**

Declassified/Released  
US Department of State  
EO Systematic Review  
30 JUN 2005

**Review Media Identifier:**  
**Review Referrals:** n/a  
**Review Release Date:** n/a  
**Review Release Event:** n/a  
**Review Transfer Date:**  
**Review Withdrawn Fields:** n/a  
**Secure:** OPEN  
**Status:** NATIVE  
**Subject:** SAG VIEWS OF DEVELOPMENTS IN MOZAMBIQUE  
**TAGS:** PINR, ZA, SF, MZ, AO, TH, PO  
**To:** LUSAKA  
**Type:** TE  
**Markings:** Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005